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HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

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MOBILE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES

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LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY OF WAR

U.S.

TRANSMITTING

IN RESPONSE TO HOUSE RESOLUTION NO. 343, INFORMATION CONCERNING THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE MOBILE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE NAMES OF ARMY POSTS WHICH HAVE BEEN LOCATED IN THEIR PRESENT SITUATIONS FOR REASONS WHICH ARE NOW TOTALLY OBSOLETE

JANUARY 29, 1912.—Referred to the Committee on Expenditures in the War Department and ordered to be printed

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DISTRIBUTION OF THE MOBILE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES.

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR,
Washington, January 25, 1912.

The SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Washington, D. C.

SIR: In compliance with the request contained in House resolution 343 I have the honor to submit the following information covering the statements made in my annual report for the year 1911, concerning the distribution of the mobile Army of the United States.

(1) The names of all Army posts which have been located in their present situations for reasons which are now totally obsolete:

Fort Apache, Ariz.,[1] established 1870, to protect the settlements against raids of Apache Indians.

Boise Barracks, Idaho, established 1863, to protect emigrant trains against the Shoshone Indians.

Fort Clark, Tex., established 1853, to guard the San Antonio and Eagle Pass wagon road and for the protection of the Rio Grande border against depredations by Mexicans and Indians.

Fort D. A. Russell, Wyo., established 1867, to protect the Union Pacific Railroad in this vicinity and the lines of travel south to Denver and north to Fort Laramie and beyond from attacks by the Arapahoe Indians.

Fort Douglas, Utah, established 1858, on account of trouble with the Mormons and to prevent depredations by Indians along the line of the overland mail route.

Fort Huachuca, Ariz., established 1881, for protection against depredations by Indians and cattle thieves.

Fort Leavenworth, Kans., established 1827, as an outpost to protect the Santa Fe trail against Indians, principally the Delawares and Pawnees.

Fort Mackenzie, Wyo., established 1898, as a central post in the vicinity of the large Indian reservations of Wyoming, Montana, and South Dakota, including the Crows, Northern Cheyennes, Shoshones, Sioux, and the Brules. The establishment of this post enabled old Forts Custer and Washakie to be abandoned.

Fort Meade, S. Dak., established 1878 to protect citizens of the Black Hills country from hostile attacks of the Sioux and other Indian tribes congregating in or inhabiting that locality.

Fort Missoula, Mont., established 1877 as a restraint upon Flathead Indians living in the vicinity.

Fort Riley, Kans., established 1853 to protect the advancing line of settlement toward the new territory acquired in the southwest as a result of the Mexican War.

Fort Robinson, Nebr., established 1874 near the Red Cloud Indian Agency, around which were gathered about 12,000 Indians, mainly Ogalala, Sioux, Cheyennes, and Arapahoes.

Fort Sill, Okla., established 1869 as the base of operation against the hostile Cheyennes and Kiowas.

Fort Snelling, Minn., established 1820 as an extreme outpost in the Indian country.

While all these posts were established for reasons that are now obsolete, new conditions have since arisen which may require the continuance of a number of them.

[1] A possibility of Indian trouble still exists.

(2) The names of all Army posts which have been located in their present situations for reasons which were from the beginning purely local:

This includes most of the posts which were established for Indian troubles, most of which were purely local.

Fort Apache, Ariz.
Boise Barracks, Idaho.
Fort Clark, Tex.
Fort Huachuca, Ariz.
Fort Mackenzie, Wyo.
Fort Meade, S. Dak.
Fort Missoula, Mont.
Fort Robinson, Nebr.
Fort Sill, Okla.
Whipple Barracks, Ariz.

(3) The names of all Army posts which were originally placed where they are with reference to possible Indian troubles, and the names of such of these as may be placed where such troubles now are no longer possible:

Boise Barracks, Idaho.
Fort D. A. Russell, Wyo.
Fort Douglas, Utah.
Fort Leavenworth, Kans.
Fort Mackenzie, Wyo.
Fort Meade, S. Dak.
Fort Missoula, Mont.
Fort Riley, Kans.
Fort Robinson, Nebr.
Fort Sill, Okla.
Fort Snelling, Minn.

Forts Clark and Huachuca were established not only with reference to possible Indian troubles, but to meet the possibility of cattle raids across the border.

(4) The names of all Army posts which are situated in positions suited to meet the strategic needs of national action or defense; and (7) the present intention of the War Department with respect to recommending legislation with a view to putting an end to the present extravagant distribution of the Army, and the steps, if any, already taken or now being taken by the department in preparing such recommendations.

It is deemed essential to discuss these two requirements together for the reason that a study of the subject of the distribution of the Army to meet the strategic needs of national action or defense necessarily involves also a careful consideration of the subject of economy of administration and supply. The two are inseparable, and any list submitted in accordance with the fourth requirement as given above would convey little meaning unless accompanied by an outline of the policy and intention that dictated such selection.

A careful study of the organization and distribution of the mobile forces of the Regular Army, both at home and abroad, is now being made by a committee of the General Staff. This subject is being considered in great detail, and upon the completion of this work and its approval by the Secretary of War, it will represent the complete policy of the War Department in this regard.

In the preparation of this study it is assumed:

First. That the strength of the mobile Army is to be the minimum consistent with present requirements.

Second. That with the troops available, adequate forces must be provided for our foreign garrisons, bearing in mind the distinct tactical mission that each has to perform in case of war. As it is very probable that these organizations can not be augmented by reenforcements from the United States after the outbreak of hostilities, it is essential that they be kept at full war strength at all times.

Third. That with the remainder a mobile force is to be organized and strategically distributed within the United States.

This study is therefore proceeding in the following logical order:

1. A determination of the mobile forces immediately required for the defense of the Philippines, Panama, Oahu, Porto Rico, and Alaska.

2. A determination of the most effective and economical means of establishing these foreign garrisons with the mobile forces now organized or authorized by Congress.

3. Plans for the organization of the mobile forces not required for foreign service into a field army at home, even though the troops now available for this purpose be inadequate for the completion of the necessary tactical and administrative units.

4. A determination of the regular mobile forces necessary for the full military security of the United States, with a view to indicating the further reforms that must wait upon the action of Congress.

This study, in so far as it concerns the Philippines garrison, has been completed and the recommendations contained therein have been approved by the Secretary of War, who is now taking steps to inaugurate the changes proposed, it is expected, without going beyond the current appropriations.

The details in regard to the organization and distribution of that portion of the mobile Army remaining within the territorial limits of the United States after the necessary detachments have been made for foreign service have not been worked out as yet, but the general conclusions of the board may be briefly summarized as follows:

If the mobile Army is to be efficient its distribution must meet the following requirements:

1. It must be favorable for the tactical training of the three arms combined (Infantry, Cavalry, and Field Artillery).

2. It must be favorable for the rapid concentration of the Army upon our northern or southern frontier or upon our eastern or western seaboard.

3. It must favor the best use of the Army as a model for the general military training of the National Guard.

4. It must favor the use of the Regular Army as a nucleus for the war organization of the National Guard and such volunteer forces as Congress may authorize to meet any possible military emergency.

5. The distribution must favor economical administration with the view of developing the maximum return for the money appropriated for military purposes.

6. The distribution must permit a peace organization which will also be effective in war; that is, an organization which will permit a prompt expansion in time of war by means of a system of reserves.

These requirements can best be met by correcting the present dispersion of the mobile Army. The mobile Army is now scattered in 49 posts. It should be segregated into detachments of all arms, each of which can be readily assembled for team training by reasonable marches of concentration. Each of the several tactical groups should be stationed in the vicinity of strategic centers where facilities are favorable for transportation, administration, and supply. The exact location of these centers should depend upon a careful study of many considerations, but they may be approximately indicated as follows:

1. Two, and possibly three, groups on the line between the St. Lawrence and Atlanta, covering the Atlantic seaboard.

2. Two and possibly three groups on the line between Puget Sound and Los Angeles, covering the Pacific seaboard.

3. At least two groups between the Great Lakes and the Rio Grande serving as first reserves for either seaboard and as nuclei for the development of the National Guard and volunteer forces to be organized in the interior of the continent.

The number of groups to be organized is primarily restricted by the total strength of the mobile Army. No group should contain less than a brigade of Infantry with a proper proportion of Cavalry, Field Artillery, and special troops, and at least one group should contain a full tactical division. Proper tactical training demands the combined use of the three arms, and this can be secured only by massing the troops of each group in a single post or in several posts within marching distance of a common center. Without such concentration joint training can not be secured except at heavy expense for transportation. In addition to these detachments of all arms, there should be at least two independent Cavalry brigades.

A study of the question indicates that the stationing of our present mobile Army in more than eight or possibly nine such groups would be inconsistent with the demands of maximum economy and tactical efficiency.

The solution of this problem is apparently complicated by the fact that the posts now occupied by the mobile Army represent a large investment which must be abandoned if an efficient plant is to be established. But while most of the posts now occupied have lost their military value, the national military reservations have acquired a great value as real estate. As a business proposition it should be possible to refund the investment and largely finance the relocation of the Army from the proceeds of the sale of the real estate which is no longer needed for military purposes. The project would be similar in many respects to the Reclamation Service as now established by Congress. In that service a fund is formed from the proceeds of the sale of certain public lands, and from this fund certain approved projects are successively executed under general rules prescribed by Congress.

It is believed that the Army can in this way be scientifically distributed at an expense little if any in excess of the proceeds of the sales of the properties to be abandoned.

Studies at the War College indicate that if the present mobile Army were concentrated in eight posts, its cost would be reduced by about $5,500,000 per annum. In six years this saving would pay for the new quartering of the mobile Army, even if nothing could be realized from the sale of real estate no longer needed.

Having in view a distribution for military efficiency and economy, it may be said that the following posts are so located as to permit their being retained as nuclei or elements of strategic concentration groups:

Fort Porter, Buffalo, N. Y.—A large post or group of posts in the Buffalo or Albany region would meet all of the requirements referred to on page 5.

There is no post at Albany at present. To concentrate all of the mobile troops allotted to the North Atlantic seaboard at this place would tend to produce the maximum effectiveness of the troops, and the maximum economy of administration and supply. The radiation of railways from Albany would facilitate the dispatch of all or

part of this force to any possible theater of operations in the North Atlantic region.

But the exact location of such a center of future concentration can only be made after a detailed study of the whole region with special reference to facilities for training. While Albany appears to possess the greatest sum of advantages in the North Atlantic region, it should be noted that the railways radiating from Buffalo are more numerous and lead toward Chesapeake Bay as well as toward New York and New England. It is safe to say that the troops in the North Atlantic region should be located on the general area between Buffalo and Albany, but the ultimate solution of the problem must rest upon a full consideration of all economic and strategic factors, and it can not be safely predicted at this time. If all or part of the troops in this region should ultimately be stationed in the vicinity of Buffalo Fort Porter, or some site near Buffalo, to be exchanged for Fort Porter, would have undoubted strategic value. After the determination of such a center, every step toward the concentration of troops at that center would be a step toward economy, tactical efficiency, and strategic effectiveness.

Fort Oglethorpe, Ga.—Near Chattanooga, Tenn. A desirable center, especially for a Cavalry brigade.

Fort McPherson, Atlanta, Ga.—A desirable center on account of the strategic location of Atlanta with reference to the South Atlantic and Gulf coasts.

Fort Sam Houston, Tex.—The best strategic position for the southern frontier.

Fort Lawton, Wash. (near Seattle), and Vancouver Barracks, Wash. (near Portland).—These posts are near the center of the Puget Sound strategic group, and one or both of them may be retained as stations in the group.

The Presidio of San Francisco, Cal., and the Presidio of Monterey, Cal.—One or both of these posts may properly be included in the California strategic group.

In each of the following groups one or more posts may properly be retained as nuclei or elements of strategic concentration centers:

GROUP I: Fort Benjamin Harrison, Ind.; Columbus Barracks, Ohio; Fort Sheridan, Ill.

As one of the future concentration groups should be in the geographical region occupied by these posts, one or more of them may be retained as stations in the group.

Maximum economy and effectiveness would no doubt be secured by concentrating all of the troops in the region in one post or in a group of posts at one center of population, but practical considerations may prevent the full attainment of this ideal. The ultimate determination of the center must wait upon a more detailed study of the region. If the general concentration is approved, this region should be studied by a special board of officers with instructions to report upon the most advantageous location of posts, the reasons for such locations, and the extent to which existing posts can be retained without prejudice to the economic and military interests of the Government.

GROUP II: Fort Des Moines, Iowa; Fort Crook, Nebr.; Fort Omaha, Nebr.; Fort Leavenworth, Kans.; Fort Riley, Kans.; Fort Snelling, Minn.; Jefferson Barracks, Mo.

As one of the future concentration groups should be in the geographical region occupied by these posts, one or more of them may be retained as stations in the group.

Maximum economy and effectiveness would no doubt be secured by concentrating all of the troops in the region in one post or in a group of posts at one center of population, but practical considerations may prevent the full attainment of the ideal. The ultimate determination of the center must wait upon a more detailed study of the region. If the general concentration is approved, this region should be studied by a special board of officers with instructions to report upon the most advantageous location of posts, the reasons for such locations, and the extent to which existing posts can be retained without prejudice to the economic and military interests of the Government.

In this group Fort Omaha, Fort Crook, Fort Des Moines, and Fort Leavenworth are each about 100 miles from a common center.

Fort Snelling and Jefferson Barracks are too distant from the other posts of the group to permit of concentration with the other units of the group for instructional purposes. Efficiency demands therefore that they should not be retained unless it is decided to make them stations for detachments of all arms. Fort Riley, with its reservation of 19,000 acres, will serve as a suitable station for a cavalry brigade and if used for this purpose will be near enough to the other stations of the group.

The following posts can not be included in the general system of strategic centers, but should be retained for the special reasons indicated in each case.

Fort Sill, Okla.—The large reservation available at this station is peculiarly adapted for use as a school of Artillery and musketry fire.

Fort Bliss, Tex., and Fort Huachuca, Ariz.—The retention of these posts as Cavalry subposts on the southern border will probably be necessary for some time.

Fort Myer, Va.—It will probably be necessary to retain a small garrison near the National Capital for escort duty and other ceremonial purposes.

(5) The names of all posts which have been constructed during the 10 years ending June 30, 1911, upon a plan which involved maximum initial cost of construction and maximum cost of maintenance in money and men; the amounts expended on such posts, respectively, for construction purposes during the said period, and what military necessity, if any, suggested the construction of such posts:

Names of posts:	Cost of construction.
Fort Benjamin Harrison, Ind	$1,202,966.71
Fort Davis, Alaska	76,936.36
Fort Des Moines, Iowa	1,377,404.90
Fort Liscum, Alaska	87,321.18
Fort Oglethorpe, Ga	1,499,884.13
Presidio of Monterey, Cal	377,263.97
Fort Sill, Okla. (new post)	1,255,288.30
Fort Wm. H. Seward, Alaska	662,539.85
Total	6,539,605.40

The names of all other posts where any construction work has been carried on during the 10 years ending June 30, 1911, upon a plan which involved maximum initial cost of construction and

maximum cost of maintenance in money and men; the amounts expended on such posts, respectively, for construction purposes during the said period and what military necessity, if any, suggested the new construction:

Names of posts:	Cost of construction.
Fort Apache, Ariz	$40, 112. 62
Fort Bliss, Tex	204, 849. 12
Boise Barracks, Idaho	361, 625. 48
Fort Brady, Mich	211, 088. 28
Fort Clark, Tex	18, 679. 55
Fort Crook, Nebr	328, 400. 23
Fort D. A. Russell, Wyo	4, 893, 164. 29
Fort Douglas, Utah	730, 123. 72
Fort Ethan Allen, Vt	937, 674. 97
Fort George Wright, Wash	530, 989. 78
Fort Gibbon, Alaska	155, 294. 07
Fort Huachuca, Ariz	88, 602. 83
Fort Jay, N. Y	213, 592. 84
Fort Lawton, Wash	503, 013. 36
Fort Leavenworth, Kans	3, 705, 763. 96
Fort Lincoln, N. Dak	536, 839. 34
Fort Logan H. Roots, Ark	212, 257. 99
Fort Mackenzie, Wyo	1, 120, 268. 50
Madison Barracks, N. Y	331, 285. 92
Fort Mason, Cal	123, 130. 09
Fort McIntosh, Tex	162, 937. 55
Fort McPherson, Ga	526, 227. 46
Fort Meade, S. Dak	995, 335. 36
Fort Missoula, Mont	551, 478. 30
Fort Myer, Va	878, 712. 86
Fort Niagara, N. Y	272, 012. 50
Fort Ontario, N. Y	548, 907. 30
Plattsburg Barracks, N. Y	253, 822. 99
Fort Porter, N. Y	21, 813. 47
Presidio of San Francisco (Infantry cantonment)	308, 056. 88
Fort Riley, Kans	2, 590, 988. 03
Fort Robinson, Nebr	648, 903. 88
Fort St. Michael, Alaska	46, 355. 50
Fort Sam Houston, Tex	2, 610, 531. 63
Fort Sheridan, Ill	941, 815. 23
Fort Snelling, Minn	1, 464, 852. 73
Vancouver Barracks, Wash	879, 632. 50
Fort Wayne, Mich	331, 954. 95
Whipple Barracks, Ariz	568, 130. 60
Fort Wm. H. Harrison, Mont	137, 972. 02
Fort Yellowstone, Wyo	659, 604. 02
Total	30, 645, 797. 76

While in some cases only a small amount has been expended on construction, the plan in all has been that of a scattered garrison involving maximum expense for sewer, water, light, and communication systems and the maximum cost in money and men for maintenance and protection.

The new construction mentioned in this paragraph was made necessary to provide additional shelter for the Army which had been greatly increased under the act of Congress, approved February 2, 1901, and to replace old buildings.

(6) The specific steps taken by the several Secretaries of War during the period of 10 years ending June 30, 1911, to prevent unnecessary expenditures and impairment of efficiency caused by ill-advised location and construction of posts and inefficient distribution of the mobile Army, and the reasons, as far as they can be

assigned, why the successive heads of the War Department have been unsuccessful in preventing unnecessary expenditures and impairment of efficiency:

In 1901 Secretary Root decided that a more concentrated system of garrisoning the mobile Army was necessary for economical administration and efficient training. Accordingly, he appointed a board of general officers to consider and make recommendations on the subject.

The failure of this effort is easily traceable to three causes.

First. Lack of appreciation on part of the Army itself of the importance of concentration.

The Army leaders had grown old under a system of scattered posts due to former Indian troubles. The board of general officers recommended 52 of the 65 Army posts for permanent occupation, 13 for temporary occupation, and the establishment of 7 new posts. Army Regulations stated nothing as to the importance of combined maneuvers, but dwelt strongly on the post commander's duty to make his post "an attractive home for the Army by every means available." For years a beautiful parklike reservation had been the surest means of gaining for the commanding officer favorable mention at the annual inspection. There had been no General Staff to consider the needs of the Army as a whole, no Chief of Staff to coordinate the idea of progressive subordinates and recommend the proper course of action. As a whole, the Army was not aware of its own shortcomings.

Second. The necessity for housing troops returning from the Philippine Islands.

The termination of active hostilities was permitting the return of many troops who had to be cared for. This led the board to recommend for temporary occupation 13 posts that were slated for ultimate abandonment. Had the troops been made to live at these posts, despite the poor condition of many, with the minimum expenditure possible for repairs until large concentrated posts had been built, millions would have been saved. But, as stated, no definite idea of concentration existed, and great pressure was brought to bear to make the existing posts comfortable. The matter of abandonment was in abeyance, and in the reconstruction of posts ultimate economy was sought by making the buildings of a more durable type—brick, stone, and concrete. Had this been done at a concentrated post the end sought would have been gained, but unfortunately the "beautiful park" idea was still in the ascendant, and the Army was saddled with the expense of maintenance of extensive roads, walks, gardens, lawns, and systems of lighting, water supply, and sewerage. Buildings of a type now recognized as extravagant were constructed. The lighting and heating of the quarters became a severe drain upon the officers' pay, until Congress came to their relief and authorized an allowance of fuel and light.

The amounts expended upon these posts became an argument against their abandonment. It seemed wrong to spend large sums of money to make a post habitable, then to withdraw the troops. Throughout the last 10 years records show this argument recurring to prevent recommended concentration being effected, while good money was thrown after bad, perpetuating the very conditions which it was desired to avoid, the pressure of immediate needs being always greater than the pressure for a distant and more or less indefinite

policy. Doubtless this argument will again be used to prevent the concentration desired by the present Secretary of War, and unless approached in the spirit of a great business corporation which ruthlessly tears down a six-story building no longer suited to its needs to erect the 20-story building found necessary, the present movement for an efficient and economically administered Army will fail as have preceding efforts.

Third. Local and political influences.

Scarcely had Mr. Root appointed his board when the War Department was deluged with letters protesting against the abandonment of certain posts, urging the extension of others, and recommending the establishment of new. These letters were from private citizens, from boards of trade, from city councils, from mayors, from governors and from Members of Congress. The reasons urged[1] varied from "the people of this community are peaceful, law-abiding, hospitable, and patriotic" to "there are 40,000 Indians near this point" and from "a beautiful site with 17 railroads radiating in every direction" to "we would find it hard to square ourselves with the community if our promises are not made good."

It seems impossible to judge the effect these letters and certain resolutions of Congress may have had upon the board and upon the War Department; a careful reading of the record and the results indicate it to have been great. We find in addition to the enlargement of many posts the following posts established without the recommendation of the board: Fort Benjamin Harrison, Ind.; Fort Des Moines, Iowa; Fort Seward, Alaska; Presidio of Monterey, Cal.; and Whipple Barracks, Ariz. Of these posts the first two were established by act of Congress.

Throughout his incumbency as Secretary of War, Mr. Root continued to represent the advisability of concentration, and actually effected it in Porto Rico. Our present large posts were started during those years, enabling better training to be given a portion of the mobile Army, but the abandonment of small posts made little progress. It is known that he urgently fought the reestablishment of Whipple Barracks, Ariz., and asked that the appropriation be stricken from the sundry civil bill, as it would compel him "to throw away $50,000 against his official judgment." Nevertheless, the post was reestablished and over half a million expended in rebuilding it. It accommodates a battalion of Infantry (peace strength). The same amount would build about one-fourth of a concentrated post for a brigade. Fifteen thousand dollars have been spent on repairs at this post during the past three years.

In 1905, the Secretary of War (Mr. Taft) urged the abandonment of posts smaller than a battalion. He brought forward the idea also of permanent stations for units and the discontinuance of frequent changes of stations. The tactical concentration of troops for training of the three arms combined had not yet been thought of, nor had it yet been appreciated that the enlisted man wanted to be a soldier instead of a laborer.

In 1906 Mr. Taft made the recommendation for the Army to be concentrated in brigades and regimental posts. He made definite recommendations for six brigade posts, and stated that there should

[1] See H. Doc. No. 618, 57th Cong., pp. 399, 503, 626, 672.

be eight in all. It is noted that prior expenditures governed his selection, as four of the posts recommended were those on which the greatest amounts had been expended. The garrisons were withdrawn from eight of the smaller posts in 1905 and 1906.

While it does not relate to the mobile Army, it should be mentioned that during Mr. Taft's period as Secretary of War the concentration idea was put in operation in the Coast Artillery, many small posts being left in charge of caretakers.

In 1909, the Secretary of War (Mr. Dickinson) quoted in his annual report a memorandum of the General Staff as to the distribution of the Army, which invited attention to the extravagance and inefficiency caused by the past policy. This study was the first concrete exhibit of the subject, which Mr. Dickinson considered of vital importance. He asked that calculation be made determining the approximate amount that would be saved and the increased efficiency that might be expected from the proposed change in order that he might submit definite recommendation for action. These calculations were made and have been furnished the present head of the War Department. Three posts were abandoned during Mr. Dickinson's incumbency as Secretary of War.

The present Secretary of War is taking steps to provide for the economic administration of the forces in our insular possessions and in the Canal Zone. A special board of General Staff officers has been appointed to make definite recommendations as to the distribution of the mobile Army. As an example of its work it may be stated that the board, in determining the garrison for Oahu, pointed the way to a plan of post for six regiments on that island, which will cost half a million less than a post in the United States constructed, under the old system, for three regiments. Similar consideration is being given the garrisons for the Philippine Islands and the Canal Zone.

In short, it may be stated that there has been a definite and natural evolution in the policy of Army distribution. The initial distribution was determined by the requirements of Indian warfare, and for some time after this distribution ceased to be necessary the personnel of the Army was still influenced by old traditions and old ideals. The movement toward concentration began to make itself felt before the Spanish-American War, but was arrested by the necessity of providing for an increased Army before suitable new stations could be provided. The demand for concentration first found expression in the demand for the battalion post instead of the old company post, and then for the regimental post instead of the battalion station. The demand in each case was based upon sound tactional and economic principles and in each case was a step toward the ideal solution. Later and more scientific study of the problem has pointed out that a mobile Army should be trained as a team of all arms and that any dispersion which prevents such training is made at the expense of efficiency and economy. This evolution has taken place in the Army itself, and the Army can not blame any other institution or persons for gradual development which is characteristic of evolution.

(8) A full statement of the serious difficulties anticipated by the department in carrying out the policies of economy and efficiency in respect to the subject matter of this inquiry:

The most serious difficulties anticipated by the department in carrying out the proposed policies are the following:

First. The opposition of communities to the abandonment of Army posts located in their vicinity.

Second. The large original outlay probably necessary to establish the proposed system of locating garrisons at places that are strategically important.

Third. The difficulty of obtaining a fair value for the buildings and land pertaining to the abandoned posts.

As to the first difficulty, past exeprience shows that it is in general a difficult matter for the War Department to abandon posts situated in the vicinity of cities. Posts so situated are a source of revenue to the business men of the community through the articles purchased by officers and men and the supplies obtained by the Quartermaster's and Subsistence Departments for the upkeep of the post. The post itself serves as a recreation park for the citizens, where they can listen to a band concert and watch the various drills of the troops. For these reasons it is only natural that communities should resist vigorously the abandonment of posts situated in their vicinity and that their Representatives in the Congress should do all in their power to carry out the wishes of their constituents. Against such practical and plainly evident reasons for the maintenance of a post near his home town the average citizen is apt to attach little importance to projects based on purely military necessity and in which he is apt to take but very little interest.

The second serious difficulty arises from the strong opposition to be expected from the people to the relatively large original outlay that will be necessary to put into execution the proposed policy of locating garrisons for strategical reasons only. Although it can be shown that such a system will result in ultimate economy, to say nothing of increased efficiency, strong opposition may be expected to any project that will even temporarily increase the already large expenditures for the support of the Army. The principal item of this increased cost will be the expenditure necessary for the enlargement of the posts already located in places that are deemed of strategic importance, in order to accommodate the garrisons removed from the abandoned posts, and for the construction of new posts at strategic points at which no garrisons are at present maintained. The development of this policy would have to be a gradual one, and, as a rule, the outlay for any particular year would not be great.

As to the third difficulty, it may be said that the cost of putting into execution the proposed policy will be greatly reduced in the end by the proceeds resulting from the sale of the buildings and land pertaining to the abandoned posts and other military reservations. For the posts situated in the vicinity of cities, it may be anticipated that there will be no difficulty in selling the officers' quarters for suburban residences and in disposing of the land for building lots, but there are a number of buildings at every Army post, such as barracks, riding halls, gun sheds, post exchange, and administration buildings, that will be difficult to dispose of for prices that will bear any relation to their original cost. Sewer and lighting systems would probably find no purchasers unless the whole post were taken over by a corporation and operated after the manner of a suburban residence park. Values in some cases would also be affected by the class of undesirable citizens that have settled in the vicinity of large posts since the abolishment of the canteen.

It should be borne in mind, however, that the increased value of the land in many cases will tend to offset the loss in value of buildings and other improvements.

(9) The names and cost of Army posts which have been abandoned during the 10 years ending June 30, 1911:

	Total cost to date.
Fort Assiniboine, Mont	$915,178.30
Benicia Barracks, Cal	27,139.80
Fort Brown, Tex	246,787.32
Fort Duchesne, Utah	179,196.69
Eagle Pass, Tex	Unknown.
Fort Grant, Ariz	79,568.07
Fort Niobrara, Nebr	143,458.95
Fort Ringgold, Tex	98,724.70
San Diego Barracks, Cal	7,134.21
Fort Thomas, Ky	626,965.78
Fort Walla Walla, Wash	362,829.24
Fort Washakie, Wyo	44,206.32
Fort Wingate, N. Mex	327,672.03
	3,058,861.41

The names and cost of all Army posts which would have to be abandoned in order to put an end to the extravagance and inefficiency resulting from improper distribution of the mobile Army:

(*a*) The following posts should be abandoned as soon as suitable provision can be made elsewhere for their garrisons:

	Total cost to date.
Fort Apache, Ariz.[1]	$73,639.07
Boise Barracks, Idaho	398,049.73
Fort Brady, Mich	445,104.17
Fort Clark, Tex	138,748.23
Fort George Wright, Wash	694,854.32
Fort Jay, N. Y. (mobile garrison only)[2]	213,592.84
Fort Lincoln, N. Dak	618,459.27
Fort Logan H. Roots, Ark	428,136.67
Fort McIntosh, Tex	224,028.50
Fort Mackenzie, Wyo	1,218,966.00
Madison Barracks, N. Y	652,934.39
Fort Meade, S. Dak	1,225,787.93
Fort Niagara, N. Y	428,547.85
Fort Ontario, N. Y	337,637.50
Fort Wayne, Mich	542,354.62
Whipple Barracks, Ariz	602,015.69
Fort Wm. Henry Harrison, Mont	478,882.58
Fort Yellowstone, Wyo	806,511.51

(*b*) The following posts are not located with a view of securing economy of administration and supply or a full measure of military effectiveness. Their garrisons should not be increased and should ultimately be withdrawn to such concentration centers as Congress may authorize:

[1] A possibility of Indian trouble near this post still exists.
[2] Not suitable for mobile troops, but should be retained as headquarters of the eastern division and as the site of the Eastern Military Prison.

	Total cost to date.
Fort Ethan Allen, Vt.	$1,007,459.61
Plattsburg Barracks, N. Y.	938,647.33
Fort Robinson, Nebr.	1,071,122.28
Fort Missoula, Mont.	593,941.00
Fort Logan, Colo.	819,253.85
Fort Douglas, Utah.	919,229.71
(Salt Lake City is a strategic point on account of the railway radiation, but this in itself is not sufficient reason for stationing a regiment at Fort Douglas. Such a regiment must forfeit opportunities of field training in combination with the other arms (Cavalry and Field Artillery), except at heavy expense for rail transportation.)	
Fort D. A. Russell, Wyo.	4,925,486.15
(This post is not located with a view to maximum economy or strategic effectiveness. Its position in a sparsely settled region involves an increased cost for transportation of manufactured supplies, and its distance from recruiting centers makes the recruitment of its garrison more costly. But there are sufficient quarters at the post for a detachment of all arms, with ample facilities for training. There is an abundant water supply at the post, and climate and sanitary conditions are excellent. There is a large maneuver ground within easy marching distance of the post.)	

The fact that a post is located upon a possible line of operations is sometimes offered as an index of strategic location. For example, Plattsburg Barracks may be said to be strategically located because it is on a natural line of advance from Canada. But this is itself is no justification for placing a peace garrison at Plattsburg. If the troops of this and other similar garrisons were assembled in a large command at some central point, as Albany, they would be better instructed, because they would have teamwork with other arms, their administration and supply would be just as available for use at Plattsburg in the event of war as they are now, and much more available for employment at all other places. The attempt to permanently scatter troops so as to cover all possible lines of advance results in dispersion which is as fatal to economy as it is to tactical and strategical effectiveness.

(10) The estimated annual saving in money which would follow an efficient and economical distribution of the mobile Army, assuming said Army to remain at its present size, and the estimated increase in number of officers and men which could efficiently be made in the mobile Army were it properly distributed within the present annual cost of maintaining the Army:

The following estimate of saving is made on the assumption that the entire mobile Army serving within the United States proper is concentrated in 8 large posts of approximately equal size and located at centers of transportation and supply, instead of in 49 posts of various sizes not generally so located. It is not claimed that it is accurate or based on anything except the opinions of officers who have given the matter their best thought. Following the table under each appropriation are notes which will serve to indicate the method pursued in determining the percentage of saving to be assumed.

Quartermaster's Department.

REGULAR SUPPLIES.

Items.	Chargeable to mobile Army in United States.	Estimated percentage.	Saving.
Care and protection of supplies	$86,000.00	60	$51,600.00
Stoves, offices, barracks, etc	5,000.00	60	3,000.00
Heating apparatus	95,260.00	30	28,578.00
Repairs and maintenance, heating apparatus	51,500.00	30	15,450.00
Heating, barracks and quarters	1,134,000.00	50	556,800.00
Lighting	619,000.00	50	309,500.00
Ice machines, maintenance	6,000.00	80	4,800.00
Cold storage	5,700.00	80	4,560.00
Stationery	55,000.00	60	33,000.00
Typewriters	10,000.00	60	6,000.00
Printing (orders, etc.)	28,000.00	60	16,800.00
Total			1,030,088.00

The heating and lighting are the two greatest savings estimated. It is believed the estimate of 50 per cent of saving is conservative for the following reasons:

1. The number of administration buildings, guardhouses, fire stations, and similar buildings would be reduced 83 per cent.
2. Buildings would be more compactly arranged.
3. A few central heating plants would be used instead of separately heated buildings.
4. Fuel would be cheaper purchased in large quantities and at great centers of supply.

The same holds for lighting, with the additional fact that the exterior lighting of our present large reservations would be discontinued.

The greatest percentage of saving assumed (80 per cent) is on maintenance of ice machines and on cold storage. These items would be little more for a large post than for a small one. The other items may be similarly considered, remembering that there would be only one-sixth of the number of posts and administrative offices, and that many matters now subjects of correspondence would be attended to by memorandum or personal instruction.

INCIDENTAL EXPENSES.

Items.	Chargeable to mobile Army in United States.	Estimated percentage.	Saving.
Postage	$2,600.00	50	$1,300.00
Telegrams and telephones	67,000.00	60	40,200.00
Extra duty:			
Barracks and quarters	4,000.00	80	3,200.00
Roads	56,000.00	80	44,000.00
Clerks	12,000.00	80	7,200.00
Overseers	10,000.00	80	8,000.00
Office furniture	17,000.00	50	8,500.00
Laborers	69,000.00	70	48,300.00
Clerks, Quartermaster's Department	588,000.00	50	294,000.00
Other employees	258,000.00	50	129,000.00
Blacksmith tools	13,000.00	50	6,500.00
Additional expenses	65,000.00	50	32,500.00
Total			622,700.00

The greatest item is for clerks and other employees, Quartermaster's Department. For clerks approximately $300,000 saving is estimated.

The consolidation of the chief quartermaster's offices of six departments into three divisions resulted in the past year in a saving of $20,000 on clerks, and a saving of $30,000 is estimated this year.

It would seem reasonable to assume the consolidation of 49 post supply offices into 8, with the accompanying reduction of work at Army and division headquarters, would result in a reduction of 50 per cent in the clerical force. There would be only 16 per cent of the offices to correspond with, 16 per cent of the estimates, requisitions, returns, and similar papers.

The 80 per cent saving estimated on extra-duty men is believed conservative. In fact, it is believed that this item would almost disappear in a concentrated post constructed on simple lines.

BARRACKS AND QUARTERS.

Items.	Chargeable to mobile Army in United States.	Estimated percentage.	Saving.
Repairs	$572,000.00	50	$286,000.00
Extra duty	7,000.00	50	3,500.00
Civilian employees	73,000.00	50	36,500.00
Window shades	3,000.00	33	1,000.00
Total			327,000.00

Initial construction was not considered. The posts now in the United States have cost approximately $95,000,000. It has been determined by the board which drew up the plan for a concentrated post on Oahu that under the concentration system the construction would cost approximately one-half this amount.

ARMY TRANSPORTATION.

Items.	Chargeable to mobile Army in United States.	Estimated percentage.	Saving.
Changing station:			
1. Transportation	$1,185,000.00	60	$711,000.00
2. Impedimenta	155,000.00	60	103,000.00
3. Animals	70,000.00	60	42,000.00
4. Horses of officers	14,000.00	60	8,400.00
5. Officers, enlisted men, and civilians, including baggage	138,000.00	60	82,800.00
6. Packing and crating	49,000.00	60	29,400.00
7. Supplies	86,000.00	60	51,600.00
Recruits	375,000.00	30	112,500.00
Agents of the various departments	62,000.00	70	43,400.00
Quartermaster stores other than clothing	529,000.00	90	476,100.00
Subsistence stores	346,000.00	90	311,400.00
Horse equipments	3,000.00	90	2,700.00
Ordnance	190,000.00	25	48,000.00
Animals	214,000.00	25	50,350.00
Funds	8,000.00	25	2,000.00
Repairs to harness (purchase of tools, etc.)	16,000.00	50	8,000.00
Repairs to wagons, etc	75,000.00	50	37,500.00
Carts	5,400.00	80	4,320.00
Employees	967,000.00	20	193,400.00
Drayage	45,000.00	50	22,500.00
Total			2,240,370.00

The greatest saving is that on changing of stations which are estimated as 60 per cent. With the permanent foreign garrisons and the concentration of the Army, it is believed that changes of station will be rare and that this estimate is very conservative. The greatest percentage assumed is 90 per cent on transportation of supplies. If the concentration stations are well selected the reduction will be all of this and probably greater, since the posts themselves will make the market if it does not already exist in sufficient development. The saving on ordnance stores is taken as only 25 per cent, as these can not be purchased locally; this estimate is based on reduced freight expenses—the delivery to 8 large railroad centers instead of to 49 scattered and, in cases, isolated posts. No savings on the purchase of wagons, and only 20 per cent on employees was estimated, as it is presumed that the Field Service Regulations allowance of transportation and teamsters would be maintained.

WATER AND SEWERS.

Items.	Chargeable to mobile Army in United States.	Estimated percentage.	Saving.
Procuring water[1]	$414,000.00	50	$207,000.00
Introducing to posts	13,000.00	60	7,800.00
Fire apparatus	30,000.00	60	18,000.00
Repairs to above	12,000.00	60	7,200.00
Disposal of sewage	50,000.00	30	15,000.00
Repair of water systems	63,000.00	50	31,500.00
Repair of plumbing	93,000.00	20	18,600.00
Repair of sewers	48,000.00	50	24,000.00
Employees	212,000.00	50	106,000.00
Total	.....	.....	435,100.00

[1] This includes pay of laborers, sinking of wells, sterilization, construction and enlargement of pumping plants, purchase of fuel for such plants, and payment for water obtained from other than military plants.

The greatest saving is on procuring water. Since a water system for a large post would not be proportionally greater in cost of operation than one for a small post, and the concentrated garrison system would do away with the extensive lawns, gardens, and roads to be watered, the estimated saving is thought conservative. The introduction of water to 8 large posts would certainly cost not more than 40 per cent as much as its introduction to 49 small posts. Only 20 per cent reduction was estimated on repairs to plumbing, as it was thought the 8 large posts would have approximately 80 per cent the fixtures now in the 49 small posts.

CONSTRUCTION AND REPAIR OF HOSPITALS.

Item.	Chargeable to mobile Army in United States.	Estimated percentage.	Saving.
Repairs	$160,000.00	50	$80,000.00

Repairs to 8 large hospitals would hardly be greater than half those to 49 smaller hospitals.

SHOOTING GALLERIES AND RANGES.

Item.	Chargeable to mobile Army in United States.	Estimated percentage.	Saving.
Shelter	$48,000.00	50	$24,000.00

Change from 49 small to 8 large posts.

MILITARY POST EXCHANGES.

Item.	Chargeable to mobile Army in United States.	Estimated percentage.	Saving.
Equipment and maintenance	$22,000.00	50	$11,000.00

Change from 49 small to 8 large posts.

ROADS, WALKS, WHARVES, AND DRAINAGE.

Items.	Chargeable to mobile Army in United States.	Estimated percentage.	Saving.
Road construction	$144,350.00	80	$115,480.00
Road repair	50,000.00	80	40,000.00
Walk construction	15,000.00	80	12,000.00
Walk repair	20,000.00	80	16,000.00
Enlisted men at work on roads	3,000.00	80	2,400.00
Other employees on roads, wharves, and drainage	20,000.00	50	10,000.00
Drainage	12,000.00	80	9,600.00
Improvement of grounds	62,000.00	80	49,600.00
Total			265,080.00

Roads and walks would practically disappear with the parklike reservations. "Improvements to grounds" would be similarly reduced in importance.

RECAPITULATION FOR QUARTERMASTER'S DEPARTMENT.

Appropriation.	Estimated savings.
Regular supplies	$1,030,088.00
Incidental expenses	622,700.00
Barracks and quarters	327,000.00
Army transportation	2,249,370.00
Water and sewers	435,100.00
Hospitals	80,000.00
Shooting galleries and ranges	24,000.00
Military post exchanges	11,000.00
Roads, walks, wharves, and drainage	265,080.00
Total for Quartermaster's Department	5,035,338.00

Subsistence Department.

Items.	Estimated chargeable to mobile Army in United States.	Estimated percentage.	Saving.
Ration articles	$3,711,028.00	4	$148,441.00
Hot coffee for troops traveling	5,000.00	50	2,500.00
Bake ovens and apparatus	10,700.00	60	6,420.00
Subsistence property (other than cooking apparatus and field ranges)	38,000.00	40	15,200.00
Compensation to civilian employees other than transport service	110,000.00	20	22,000.00
Extra duty	30,000.00	80	24,000.00
Wastage in issue and transportation	15,000.00	10	1,500.00
Total			220,061.00

The greatest saving is on ration articles. This saving, estimated as 4 per cent, is based on competition that would result from the local purchase of supplies in such large quantities. The highest percentage is on extra-duty pay, resulting from the change from 49 posts to 8. The great saving in transportation has been considered under the Quartermaster's Department.

Medical Department.

Items.	Estimated chargeable to mobile Army in United States.	Estimated percentage.	Saving.
Medical and hospital supplies	$200,000.00	40	$80,000.00
Hospital matrons	3,000.00	60	1,800.00
Hospital nurses	20,000.00	60	12,000.00
Total			93,800.00

There are many expensive appliances which are necessary at all hospitals, regardless of size. There are many hospitals which are but rarely used. In some cases the large hospital requires no more than the small, and the purchase of such articles could be reduced about 80 per cent; the estimate of 40 per cent on supplies in general is therefore thought conservative.

Pay Department.

Items.	Savings estimated.
Mileage:	
Inspection by—	
1. Department and division commanders	$1,000.00
2. Inspector General's Department	2,500.00
3. Quartermaster's Department	5,500.00
4. Subsistence Department	500.00
5. Medical Department	800.00
6. Ordnance Department	2,400.00
Returning from conducting recruits	4,000.00
Examination for promotion	9,000.00
Changes of station	66,600.00
Courts-martial	6,000.00
Horsemanship tests	2,000.00
Payment of troops	18,000.00
Travel for dental and medical treatment	6,000.00
Total mileage	124,300.00

Pay Department—Continued.

Items.	Savings estimated.
Officers returned to duty with the line (6)	$21,600.00
Clerks (6)	9,000.00
Messengers (7)	4,200.00
	34,800.00
Total for Pay Department	159,100.00

ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT AND SIGNAL CORPS.

While there might be some saving on clerical assistance, it is believed that it would be too small to warrant consideration. The saving on mileage has been included under the Pay Department.

CORPS OF ENGINEERS.

It is not believed that any saving would result in this corps on account of the concentration.

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT.

The work of this department would be simplified by such a reduction in administrative units and the clerical force could be reduced so as to to effect a large saving.

RECAPITULATION.

The estimates herein made were based upon the assumption of a concentration in eight strategic areas, using such data as were immediately available. They are believed to be conservative.

Quartermaster's Department	$5,036,138
Subsistence Department	220,000
Medical Department	91,800
Pay Department	159,100
Total estimate	5,507,038

In reference to the last clause of subdivision 10 of your resolution, I beg to say that this saving would, if devoted to military purposes, enable 10 regiments of Infantry, with an enlisted strength of 900 men each, to be added to the mobile Army. This allows $500 as an average annual cost for each enlisted man and nearly $900,000 per year for overhead charges, due to the increased administration expenses.

Or it would enable each company, troop, and battery of the mobile Army to be increased by 20 privates, allowing $500 per year per man. The usual estimate of $1,100 per rifle is erroneous, as it charges to the enlisted man the full cost of maintenance of the Army, while over 50 per cent of this cost is not affected by an increase or decrease in the enlisted force.

Or it would pay the cost of 100,000 reservists at an annual cost of $55 per man, a number sufficient to bring the entire mobile Army to war strength and to form the necessary depot battalion from

which losses would be replaced, thus doing away with the necessity for filling the ranks of the highly trained organizations with raw recruits in an emergency requiring the highest state of efficiency in our first line of defense.

In addition to this actual increase in numbers, there would be an increase in effective officers and men by returning to duty those now on extra and special duty. This is estimated as 5 per cent of the strength. The reduction in men required for guard and fatigue duties would add an additional 5 per cent to the number available for daily training. In event of a sudden call the number of men available to take the field would be between 5 and 10 per cent greater than at present, as there would not be necessary the many detachments of caretakers. This would be more marked in the Medical Department than in the line, since each of the 49 post hospitals would have to be kept in operation for the care of the sick, who could not be abandoned, while under the concentrated system there would be but 8 hospitals to be continued.

The great items of pay and clothing are not affected at all by the redistributions, and the subsistence only slightly. The expenses of the Coast Artillery Corps are unchanged, and the foreign garrisons have not been considered.

With reference to the foreign garrisons, it might be stated that the plan for concentration is now being put into effect in the insular possessions and Panama. The necessity for increasing the garrison of Oahu and for establishing that in the Canal Zone would have caused a great increase in the transport service had the system of changing regiments and scattered garrisons been continued. With the changes already approved and those under consideration it is believed that the water transportation for all these garrisons will cost little if any more than the cost in the past for the Philippine garrison alone. While this will not decrease expenses, it will prevent an otherwise necessary increase.

In so far as it has been practicable the principle of concentration has been put in operation for the Coast Artillery, and the result has been increased economy, ease, and efficiency of administration.

HENRY L. STIMSON,
Secretary of War.

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